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In canonical accounts of war, conﬂict outcomes are inherently uncertain. Contesting liter-
atures posit that this uncertainty, arising from stochastic elements of the war-ﬁghting process,
may induce conﬂict due to greater risks of miscalculation or foster peace by breeding caution.
We theorize that states, on average, exhibit prudence when confronting greater uncertainty. De-
spite its conceptual importance, extant proxies for uncertainty at various levels of analysis—
such as polarity, balance-of-power, system concentration, and dyadic relative capabilities—
are imprecise and theoretically inappropriate indicators. To overcome this shortcoming, we
theorize the conditions that elevate the magnitude of uncertainty over conﬂict outcomes and
introduce a novel measure that captures this uncertainty within any k-state system. Through
extensive empirical analysis, we conﬁrm uncertainty’s pacifying effect, and show how this
effect operates at different levels of analysis.
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Reﬂecting on the uncertainty that accompanies military conﬂict, Churchill wrote “The States-
man who yields to war fever must realise that once the signal is given, he is no longer the master of
policy but the slave of unforeseeable and uncontrollable events.”1 Does awareness of this inherent
uncertainty over a conﬂict’s course and outcome affect whether conﬂict occurs at all? If so, is this a
pacifying or incendiary effect? Prominent debates in security studies address whether outcome un-
certainty induces conﬂict through miscalculation or peace due to caution and whether uncertainty
is a function of dyadic or multilateral factors (Waltz, 1979; Blainey, 1988; Kugler and Lemke,
1996). This article aims to settle these debates, showing that greater uncertainty over war out-
comes reduces the likelihood of war occurrence and that the optimal conception and measurement
of uncertainty incorporates multilateral factors. We develop a theory specifying the conditions that
elevate the magnitude of outcome uncertainty and linking this uncertainty to state behavior. Our
theory emphasizes the complexity of the estimation task confronting a war initiating state when
evaluating the conﬂict entry and alignment choices of third party actors. Speciﬁcally, outcome un-
certainty increases with wider power parity as there are more potential belligerents with sufﬁcient
military capabilities to meaningfully alter war’s outcome. When facing greater uncertainty, states
behave cautiously. Building from these theoretically informed foundations, we introduce a new
measure of uncertainty enabling tests and conﬁrmation of the hypothesis that the “unforeseeable”
nature of conﬂict is a cause of peace.
To clarify the scope of our analysis, consider uncertainty’s pivotal role across the international
conﬂict literature. At least three broad types of uncertainty are invoked: uncertainty over states’
intentions, uncertainty over states’ resolve or material capabilities, and uncertainty over conﬂict
outcomes. The ﬁrst, uncertain intentions, underpins the security dilemma (Jervis, 1978). A peer
state acquiring arms is problematic given the uncertain objective—offensive or defensive—of that
actor. Mistaken perceptions may culminate in spiraling hostilities or deterrence failures (Jervis,
1Quoted in Mitzen and Schweller (2011).
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1976; Kydd, 1997; Trager, 2010). The second, uncertainty concerning a state’s resolve or capa-
bilities, when coupled with incentives to misrepresent the truth, generate information asymmetries
and one of the primary rationalist explanations for war (Fearon, 1995; Powell, 1999; Slantchev,
2003; Fey and Ramsay, 2011). Unfortunately, both types of uncertainty are difﬁcult to measure
and consequently relegated to the error term in statistical analyses of conﬂict (Gartzke, 1999).
Our study concerns the third form, Churchill’s uncertainty over conﬂict outcomes. When war is
depicted as a costly lottery, the uncertainty about its outcome persists even in complete information
settings. Hence, uncertainty over capabilities will affect uncertainty over outcomes, but the latter
persists even if the former is absent. Though employed as a modeling convenience, the randomness
captured by the lottery formulation is deeply grounded in both theoretical and historical accounts
of war. Clausewitz’s (1976, p. 119) discussion of friction provides an exposition of the concept.
Schelling (1966, p. 93) echoes a similar sentiment:
Violence, especially war, is a confused and uncertain activity, highly unpredictable, de-
pending on decisions made by fallible human beings organized into imperfect govern-
ments, depending on fallible communications and warning systems and on the untested
performance of people and equipment.
Scholars of international relations have long disputed the effects of outcome uncertainty. At a
strictly bilateral level the consensus is that dyads with roughly equivalent capabilities, which are
associated with high outcome uncertainty, are more likely to have conﬂict (Kugler and Lemke,
1996; Reed, 2003). However, the association between bilateral parity and bilateral conﬂict pro-
vides a limited, and ultimately misleading, understanding of how outcome uncertainty affects war
onset. As others have emphasized (Bueno de Mesquita, 1983; Maoz, 1996; Sobek and Clare,
2013), dyadic interactions do not occur in isolation. Estimates of uncertainty about a war’s out-
come should account for multilateral factors. Which multilateral factors matter and what their
implications are for linking outcome uncertainty to state behavior are subject to debate (for exam-
ple, Singer, Bremer and Stuckey 1972; Bueno de Mesquita 1981; Huth, Bennett and Gelpi 1992;
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Bennett and Stam 2004). We bring clarity to this often muddled debate by theorizing how at-
tributes such as polarity, the balance of power, and estimation complexity relate to uncertainty’s
magnitude and conﬂict likelihood. Contrary to the conclusions of strictly bilateral studies, we an-
ticipate that higher outcome uncertainty reduces the probability of conﬂict. The logic is as follows:
given that conﬂict does not occur in isolation, potential belligerents must assess the probable re-
actions of multiple states in the event of violence onset. As elaborated upon in the theory section,
outcome uncertainty is elevated when there is relative power parity across many third party actors,
as each state’s entry and alignment choices may meaningfully alter the conﬂict’s outcome. Late
19th-century Europe typiﬁes this scenario. We expect that state leaders exercise prudence when
confronting such uncertainty. In contrast, a stark hierarchical distribution of power simpliﬁes the
strategic setting for conﬂict initiators. The Cold War era is representative of a low uncertainty
context. Everything else being equal, certainty induces state leaders to exhibit less caution due to
the relative simplicity of this estimation task, thus increasing the probability of conﬂict.
Despite its theoretical importance, no compelling multilateral measure of uncertainty exists to
test our hypotheses. Must outcome uncertainty be left to the error term as well? Working from the
common costly lottery assumption, we build a ﬂexible measure of uncertainty that can be tailored
to include any theoretically appropriate set of states ranging from the two constituent states of a
dyad to all countries in the international system. After demonstrating desirable properties of the
new measure as compared to alternative extant proxies, we subject our hypotheses to extensive
empirical tests at multiple levels of analysis and ﬁnd strong support for our contention that greater
outcome uncertainty, particularly at the system level, is a cause of peace.
The remainder of the article proceeds as follows. The next section theorizes the links between
uncertainty over conﬂict outcomes and conﬂict initiation, deduces our hypotheses, and connects
this discussion to the existing literature. We then outline the construction of the newmeasure, high-
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lighting its theoretical grounding, ﬂexibility, and behavior. The subsequent section introduces the
research design, describes the results, and discusses their implications. The ﬁnal section concludes.
Theorizing Uncertainty and Conﬂict Onset
In this section, we construct a theoretical framework tying uncertainty to conﬂict and generate
testable hypotheses. Despite the concept’s prominence in the literature, links between uncertainty
over conﬂict outcomes and conﬂict onset are often under-theorized or offer contrasting, at times
contradictory, hypotheses (Bennett and Stam, 2004). Much of this confusion arises due to inconsis-
tencies in the theoretical foundations of outcome uncertainty. We strive to clarify this ambiguous
debate and formulate clear empirical expectations.
A compelling theory of outcome uncertainty’s effect on conﬂict initiation must ﬁrst specify
what factors shape the magnitude of outcome uncertainty and then hypothesize how uncertainty2
inﬂuences state behavior. To do so, we develop a theory with three components. First, we address
how polarity relates to the degree of uncertainty in any n-state setting. Second, we incorporate the
broader distribution of capabilities into the conception of uncertainty because polarity alone masks
variation in uncertainty levels.3 Third, we posit that the estimation complexity and likelihood of
high war costs associated with greater outcome uncertainty induces caution. Explicitly stating an
expectation of caution ties outcome uncertainty to state behavior. Putting the components together,
we hypothesize that multipolar power distributions skewing toward perfect parity across states—
that is, parity amongst the major powers and parity amongst minor powers—have the greatest
outcome uncertainty and that higher uncertainty reduces the likelihood of conﬂict onset.
2We refer to uncertainty over outcomes by the shorthand of uncertainty for the remainder of this work.
3Huth, Bennett and Gelpi (1992) and Huth, Gelpi and Bennett (1993) provide alternative, but complementary,
conceptions of how these indicators affect uncertainty. However, our operationalization of the uncertainty measure in
Section 3 is a stark departure from prior work.
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The ﬁrst component of the theory posits that decreasing the number of great powers reduces
uncertainty. Multipolar systems are the most uncertain as the conﬂict responses of many power-
ful actors can sway war’s trajectory. Estimating whether the great powers abstain from conﬂict,
or which side they join should they enter, muddy expectations of war’s outcome. Concerns over
abstention versus joining highlight why polarity is relevant even for conﬂicts that ultimately re-
main limited to minor powers. Moreover, the complexities associated with great power alliances
which introduce the dual threats of buck-passing and entrapment elevate multipolarity’s uncer-
tainty (Waltz, 1979; Christensen and Snyder, 1990; Grant, Forthcoming). In contrast, simplicity
and certainty are characteristic of bipolar and unipolar systems where few states can sway war
outcomes. While the literature widely agrees that more poles increase uncertainty (Mearsheimer,
2001), the effect of uncertainty on war proclivity is contested. Typifying the logic that multipolarity
fosters conﬂict, Waltz (1979, p. 168) argues that “rather than making states properly cautious and
forwarding the chances of peace, uncertainty and miscalculations cause wars.” A competing view
claims that uncertainty paciﬁes by making states cautious when forced to divide their resources
and attention between many potential threats (Deutsch and Singer, 1964; Singer, 1989). Others
assert that unipolarity is prone to conﬂict due to either the challenges of rising states or the lack of
balancing coalitions to deter military endeavors mounted by the hegemon (Monteiro, 2011; Layne,
2012).
Second, we argue that a balanced distribution of capabilities, as opposed to one of preponder-
ance, creates greater uncertainty. The intuition is straightforward in a dyadic setting as conﬂict’s
outcome is less certain when the warring parties are evenly matched. This extends to multilateral
settings where, under broad parity, any state’s entry into war and alignment choice may meaning-
fully affect the outcome, whereas in hierarchical distributions, a single state’s entry and alignment
likely dictates conﬂict outcomes. While belligerents may be unsure of what the preponderant
power will do, the estimation task lacks the complexity present in assessing how multiple evenly
matched states will respond.
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Our assertion that balance increases uncertainty relates to a debate in the literature as to whether
such balance fosters peace. Blainey (1988) argues that a balanced distribution incites conﬂict as
opposing sides can both reach overly optimistic assessments of their prospects for victory. Al-
ternatively, balance may promote peace because victory is unassured, or due to greater expected
conﬂict costs (Waltz, 1959, 1979; Mearsheimer, 2001). Balance emerges from defensive actions to
deter would-be aggressors and is thus deﬁnitionally associated with peace. Absent balance, con-
ﬂicts occur “because there is nothing to prevent them” (Waltz, 1959, p. 232). A third contention
is that the distribution of power has an indeterminate effect on conﬂict. Instead, conﬂict occurs
when a disconnect exists between the balance of power and the balance of beneﬁts—such as the
distribution of wealth (Powell, 1999; Reed et al., 2008).
Consider how the interaction between the ﬁrst and second components of our theory impacts
the magnitude of outcome uncertainty. It follows that a multipolar system exhibiting parity both
amongst the poles and amongst the weaker states will approach the upper bound of uncertainty. In
contrast, uncertainty is minimized when there is unipolarity and when that unipolar system has a
distinct hierarchy, even among the weaker states. That is, the second most powerful state enjoys
preponderance over the third most powerful, and so forth. Between these outer bounds are an array
of intermediate cases which reveal the insufﬁciency of using polarity or the capability distribution
alone as a measure of uncertainty. For instance, it is unclear ex ante whether uncertainty is larger
in a balanced bipolar system than in a hierarchical multipolar system. The measure introduced
in the following section builds from these foundations and provides theoretical underpinnings for
adjudicating between these more complicated intermediate cases.
Note that the discussion thus far spans multiple levels of analysis. For instance, structural real-
ists typically argue that the greatest explanatory power derives from systemic attributes while bar-
gaining theory looks to dyadic factors. Perhaps the potency of effects varies across levels. Indeed,
a large literature suggests that such heterogeneity exists (Waltz, 1959; Singer, 1961; Gleditsch and
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Hegre, 1997; Ray, 2001; Chiozza and Goemans, 2011). This study examines how outcome un-
certainty at multiple levels of analysis contributes to our understanding of conﬂict’s origins. That
is, the primary interest is shifting the level of our explanatory variable, not the unit at which the
outcome is observed. A beneﬁt of this approach, as highlighted in recent work (for example, Brau-
moeller 2008), is that systemic attributes can yield valuable insights when employed in conjunction
with the typical dyadic measures.
The third component of the theory links uncertainty to state behavior, stipulating that states ex-
ercise caution when confronting higher outcome uncertainty. Within the extant literature, empirical
expectations about outcome uncertainty’s effect on conﬂict onset are ambiguous. How uncertainty
tied to both polarity and the balance of power affects peace is debated. As a striking example of
the ambiguity, structural realism generates contradictory expectations. Greater uncertainty under
multipolarity promotes conﬂict, while greater uncertainty from a balanced distribution of power
fosters peace. Ultimately, these debates hinge on unstated assumptions about actor responses to
uncertainty (Bueno de Mesquita, 1981).
We argue actors respond to higher uncertainty with caution due to greater complexity in antici-
pating conﬂict outcomes and larger expected costs to conﬂict. Outcome uncertainty increases with
the number of third parties that can join a conﬂict and meaningfully sway its course. Given that
potential initiators are interested in assessing relevant third party reactions to conﬂict onset, the es-
timative complexity of this task increases with the degree of uncertainty. Gauging the decisions of
numerous equally powerful states (high uncertainty) to join or abstain is more difﬁcult than assess-
ing the dominant state’s reaction in a starkly hierarchical system (low uncertainty). Furthermore,
the expected costs of ﬁghting are greater in a high uncertainty environment. Conﬂict expansion
resulting in greater destruction and fatalities becomes increasingly likely as more states are capa-
ble of altering the outcome. Empirical tests in the supporting appendix validate this assumption by
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demonstrating that conditional on a conﬂict occurring, greater uncertainty is associated with more
states joining and higher fatalities.
With all three theoretical components in place, we now set forth two hypotheses. Given the
anticipation of cautious behavior, it follows that conﬂict will occur less frequently during periods
of high uncertainty in the international system.
H1: Higher systemic uncertainty, arising from an increase in the number of great
powers and a more balanced distribution of capabilities, will reduce the total number
of conﬂicts in the system and the likelihood of conﬂict onset within dyads.
As a further check, we test whether the hypothesized relationship holds at different levels of
analysis. Our ﬁrst hypothesis necessitates a system uncertainty measure that is identical across
all observations within a given year. It is also plausible, however, that the decisions of potential
belligerents might be inﬂuenced by only a subset of states, not all members of the international
system. Accordingly, we construct regional uncertainty scores tailored to a speciﬁc geographic
area or a speciﬁc dyad. Doing so enables a test of our propositions at a sub-systemic level while
also highlighting the ﬂexibility of the new measure. When constructing a dyad speciﬁc regional
score, we identify a relevant set of actors unique to each dyad which, for example, could include
neighbors of the two constituent states plus the major powers in that period. This construction ex-
cludes potentially irrelevant states from each observation’s uncertainty score and introduces greater
variation in the index.
H2: Higher regional uncertainty, arising from an increase in the number of great pow-
ers and a more balanced distribution of capabilities, will reduce the total number of
conﬂicts in the region and the likelihood of conﬂict onset in that region’s constitutive
dyads.
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A ﬁnal note is in order. As is clear from the theory’s components, we assume that multiple
actors’ capabilities must be accounted for even when evaluating whether a single dyad will ex-
perience conﬂict. Bilateral uses of force do no transpire in a vacuum; conﬂict initiators consider
the responses of third party actors. This might appear to be at odds with existing studies suggest-
ing that conﬂict often remains contained to the two initiating parties (Gartner and Siverson, 1996;
Smith, 1996; Werner, 2000). However, as these studies make clear, a conﬂict remaining dyadic
does not imply the ﬁghting parties neglect third party actors. Rather, states may be highly cog-
nizant of the multilateral situation and only initiate conﬂict when they expect outside states that
could swing conﬂict’s outcome will remain on the sidelines. This account is consistent with our
theory as it suggests that on the equilibrium path, most conﬂict remains dyadic because states err
on the side of caution (do no ﬁght) in more complex international environments. These complex
scenarios where multiple states could enter and alter conﬂict’s trajectory are the high uncertainty
instances that we anticipate make conﬂict onset less likely. In sum, a measure accounting for third
party actors is theoretically valid, and necessary, even if most conﬂicts remain bilateral.4
A New Measure of Uncertainty
In accordance with the hypotheses derived in the previous section, our focus is on measuring
uncertainty about war outcomes. The standard approach in the literature to modeling war between
two states (A and B from now on) is to treat war as a costly lottery. With this approach, the
outcome of war is determined by a Bernouilli trial: state A wins with probability p and loses to
B with probability 1 − p. Parameter p ∈ [0, 1] is modeled with a simple contest success function
that takes as argument the relevant factors affecting the two state’s likelihoods of winning the war
4By this same reasoning, polarity is important even when analyzing conﬂicts that do not involve major powers.
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where Ci is a measure of state i’s military capabilities and thus p reﬂects a state’s share of total
dyadic capabilities. The dominant measure for Ci in the international conﬂict literature, for in-
stance, is the Composite Index of National Capability (CINC) score from the Correlates of War
data set, developed by Singer, Bremer and Stuckey (1972).5
At the dyadic level, when war is modeled as a costly lottery, the uncertainty about the outcome
of war depends on the value of p. In particular, the variance of this Bernoulli trial is p(1 − p),
which is maximized at p=.5, when the dyad is at parity. To characterize this uncertainty in a
non-directed form, we redeﬁne p as p = min{CA,CB}
CA+CB
to represent the balance of power within the
dyad, which insures that the variance of the Bernoulli trial is increasing in p. Note that the random
component of a Bernoulli trial allows for victories by the weaker state even when there is high, but
incomplete, certainty about conﬂict outcomes, such as in the Vietnam War. To ﬁx ideas, consider
a more concrete parallel. A fair coin toss, analogous to cases where p=0.5, has the maximum
uncertainty about whether the coin lands heads or tails. In contrast, there is no uncertainty about
the outcome when ﬂipping a double-headed coin, which is equivalent to a conﬂict where p=0.
Our goal is to develop a measure that goes beyond the dyadic level to characterize uncertainty
of outcomes at the regional level, and ultimately, at the level of the international system. This
measure should behave in accordance with our theoretical contentions that more poles and greater
balance increase uncertainty. As discussed in the theory section, conﬂicts between two states rarely
occur in isolation from third parties. Hence a good measure of outcome uncertainty should take
into account interactions with, and between, other relevant states that might get involved in the
5CINC score represents the average of a given state’s proportion of total system capabilities in six areas: total pop-
ulation, urban population, iron/steel production, energy consumption, military personnel, and military expenditures.
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conﬂict between the two states. These relevant states can be major powers that show interest in
disputes in different parts of the world, or they could be smaller states immediately neighboring
the states involved in the dispute. An appropriate measure should allow ﬂexibility regarding which
states are considered relevant for a given dyad.
To develop a measure satisfying the above criteria, we generalize the idea of outcome uncer-






non-directed potential dyadic conﬂict interactions. The measure we describe pro-
vides a single statistic that summarizes the uncertainty about the outcomes of all these interactions.
For a given dyad d between countries A and B in a given year, deﬁne the relevant set Rd of
N ∈ [2, . . . , N¯ ] countries that are relevant for a conﬂict between A and B, where N¯ represents
the total number of countries in the system in that year. Relevance might be deﬁned to include
all states in the international system or it might be dyad speciﬁc—deﬁned based on factors like
contiguity, major power status, trade relationships, or memberships in international organizations.
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∈ [0, .5] in the ith row and jth column represents the non-directed balance
of capabilities between states i and j.6 Due to the way we deﬁned p, the above matrix is symmetric,
and a given cell can only include values between 0 and .5. Denote E1 as the ﬁrst eigenvalue of
6The diagonal entries can be ignored, as the resulting metric will not depend on the speciﬁc value of pii due to
normalization. WLOG, we use pii = 0 in our calculations.
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matrix Pd.7 The ﬁrst eigenvalue provides a single summary statistic of the overall uncertainty
present in the included dyads which is ideal because it parsimoniously captures the underlying
concept of interest. There are two limiting cases for Pd that are theoretically interesting and will
help capture the logic of our measure:
1. Perfect parity: When the relevant set is comprised of states that all have equal capabilities,
all the non-diagonal cells of matrix Pd will be equal to .5. This limiting case is the largest
value E1 can take, call it E¯1. Theoretically, this represents the scenario with the highest level
of outcome uncertainty.
2. Complete hierarchy: In this scenario, assume that there is a complete hierarchy between the
states in the relevant set, in the sense that when states are ranked based on their capabilities,
pij = 0. That is, even the second most powerful state is totally insigniﬁcant when matched
against the most powerful state, and the third most powerful is completely insigniﬁcant when
matched against the second most powerful, and this type of relationship holds for the rest of
the states. This limiting case gives the minimum value E1 can take, call it E1. Theoretically,
this represents the scenario with the lowest systemic uncertainty as all potential conﬂicts will
have a clear predicted winner. Complete hierarchy is a theoretical extreme that is unlikely to
exist in its pure form. However, some observed capability distributions will tend toward this
extreme in which a state’s military capacity is simultaneously dwarfed by a stronger state’s
capacity and dwarfs a weaker state’s capacity. The degree to which observations approach
this extreme, as opposed to cases where some or all adjacent relationships approach parity,
is a revealing characteristic of that distribution that is of theoretical interest.8
7Since Pd is symmetric, all of its eigenvalues, including E1, are real. In this paper, we only use the largest
eigenvalue in our measure. Smaller eigenvalues of Pd could also provide valuable information about the link between
uncertainty and the likelihood of conﬂict, which we leave as a topic for future research.
8Instances approaching complete hierarchy are observationally common, at least within subsets of states. Consider
a hypothetical contested issue concerning The Bahamas in which the relevant states in ascending order of power are
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It is clear from above that Uncertaintyyd ∈ [0, 1], and larger values represent more uncertainty.
As shown in examples below, the amount of uncertainty in intermediate cases between the limiting
extremes increases with the degree of widespread power parity.
Weighted Uncertainty
The above analysis treats each dyad equally when constructing a measure of uncertainty. Alterna-
tively, one can weight cells of matrix Pd such that dyads satisfying certain criteria receive a larger
weight. For instance, it might be desirable that dyads involving more powerful states contribute to
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where wij represents the weight assigned to dyad ij. An example speciﬁcation that we will use
in our empirical analysis is wij =
CA+CB−Cij
C¯ij−Cij , where C¯ij represents the dyad with the maximum
total capability, and C ij represents the weakest dyad. This weighting scheme makes sure that
wij ∈ [0, 1], with the most powerful dyad getting wij = 1, and the weakest dyad getting wij = 0.
The Bahamas, Cuba, and the US. Based on 1992 CINC scores, the third most powerful states is insigniﬁcant when
matched against the second most powerful state (p < .02) and the second most powerful is insigniﬁcant when matched
against the most powerful (p < .02).
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If we deﬁne PWd = Wd ∗ Pd where each cell of Pd is multiplied by its corresponding weight from








1 deﬁned similarly as in the unweighted case.
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This measure reﬂects the components of our theory and satisﬁes the criteria we mentioned in
the beginning of this section. First, for any dyad, the measure takes into account the uncertainty
in other relevant dyads. As the limiting cases illustrate, a balanced power distribution has high
uncertainty. Second, weighting insures that stronger dyads, dyads that are more likely to get into
conﬂict, or dyads that satisfy other user-speciﬁed criteria, contribute more to the overall uncertainty
score. By emphasizing the most powerful dyads, the measure reﬂects our theoretical contention
regarding polarity. Another feature of the measure is its ﬂexibility to incorporate any standard or
user-deﬁned capability index or contest success function in deﬁning pij .10 We discuss additional
properties of the measure in the supporting appendix.
System Uncertainty
In accordance with the theories discussed in Section 2, of particular interest is uncertainty at the
systemic level, where the relevant set of states for any dyad includes all states in the international
system. System uncertainty scores are identical across all dyads in a given year because the annual
relevant set is constant. In our sample for the empirical analysis, the size of the relevant set ranges
from 23 in 1816 to 193 in 2007, with the unweighted system uncertainty score ranging from .20 in
9Besides weighting based on capabilities, we also consider weighting by alliance portfolio similarities (S-scores)
and dyadic distance in our analyses (Signorino and Ritter, 1999).
10This ﬂexibility is important because CINC scores have notable limitations—for example, CINC ranks China as
the most powerful state since 1996. We leave the development of superior measures to future research.
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1946 to .37 in 1818. The system uncertainty score could also be deﬁned just for politically relevant
dyads, or for dyads among major powers in the system. For our empirical analyses, we employ the
system score for politically relevant dyads.
[Figure 1 about here.]
Figure 1 plots the system uncertainty score for politically relevant dyads from 1816 to 2007. At
ﬁrst glance, the trends seem consistent with discussions of polarity which stipulate that multipolar
systems involve more uncertainty while bipolar systems involve less.11 However, the trends also
indicate that there are considerable variations within each systemic period, suggesting that other
factors beyond polarity are needed to fully understand variations in systemic uncertainty. This is
also apparent in Panel A of Table 1, where we plot the P matrix for the 5 most powerful states
in the system in four different years. The top two tables represent years 1855 and 1912 from the
multipolar period, while the bottom two represent years 1955 and 1990 from the bipolar world.
As seen in the table, 1990 registers a larger uncertainty score than 1855, which shows that beyond
signiﬁcant variations within each polarity period, years of bipolarity can entail more uncertainty
than multipolar years when there is broader parity between both the poles and the non-poles.
[Table 1 about here.]
Regional Uncertainty
We also deﬁne a dyad-speciﬁc “regional” uncertainty score where the relevant set of states for a
given dyad varies. In our empirical analyses, we deﬁne the relevant set in two ways: ﬁrst, we divide
11Though older CINC scores are potentially more prone to measurement error, this is unlikely to account for the
post-WorldWar II decrease in uncertainty. Older uncertainty scores would be artiﬁcially increased only if measurement
error took the non-random form of systematically coding states as closer to parity than they actually are. Additionally,
if capabilities are measured with random error then the variance of error in our measure will be smaller than for a
typical dyadic balance of capabilities measure.
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the world into ﬁve geographical regions, and all states in a dyad’s geographical region are included
in the relevant set for that dyad. Second, the relevant set is composed of all major powers and any
state neighboring one of the states in the dyad, where neighboring is deﬁned as land contiguous
or separated by waters less than 400 nautical miles. As described above, these are only two ways
of deﬁning relevance among many others. Alternative deﬁnitions might exclude non-neighboring
major powers from the relevant set or include all states in the international system if a dyad includes
a major power.
Extant Proxies for Uncertainty
Perhaps due to the difﬁculties with operationalizing the concept of uncertainty, there have been
few direct attempts in the international relations literature to measure outcome uncertainty. One
measure occasionally used as an indicator for uncertainty is the concentration index (Ray and





where Ci is country i’s proportion of the total system capabilities. For any N>1, it is easy to
see that this measure attains its maximum value 1 when one state holds all the capabilities in the
system, and its minimum 0 when power is equally divided across all states. Accordingly, scholars
have used Dispersion = 1− CON as a component in measures of uncertainty in the international
system (Huth, Bennett and Gelpi, 1992; Huth, Gelpi and Bennett, 1993).
CON and our measure are closely related when states in the international system have roughly
equal capabilities. In such scenarios, our system uncertainty measure takes a larger value, while
CON gets smaller. When there are sizable imbalances in the international system, however, the
two measures differ signiﬁcantly. When there is a hegemon in the system that holds a large share
of total capabilities, CON will approach its maximum value 1. In such scenarios, CON mostly
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ignores relative capabilities between the remaining powers in the system. Our measure, however,
captures variations of power imbalances and resulting variations in uncertainty among the weaker
powers as well. Our measure attains its minimum value only when there is a complete hierarchy
in the system, in which each state completely dominates the state that follows it in terms of capa-
bilities. For CON to attain its maximum value, however, it is enough that the most powerful state
dominates all other states, even when all the remaining N-1 states are at parity among each other.
Consider an example highlighting Uncertainty’s superiority to Dispersion as a measure of out-
come uncertainty. Panel B of Table 1 shows the distribution of capabilities from 1890 and 1992,
noting the CINC scores of the six strongest states. We can summarize the two systems on the
salient theoretical attributes of polarity and balance. The 1890 distribution is multipolar and rela-
tively balanced while the 1992 distribution is not multipolar and is relatively unbalanced. As the
theory section stipulated, outcome uncertainty increases with polarity and greater power parity.
Accordingly, this is an easy test where 1890 should register higher uncertainty scores. However,
only Uncertainty passes the test and identiﬁes 1890 as the more uncertain year. Dispersion ﬁnds
the inverse of the theoretical expectation, suggesting that while CON is a good measure of power
concentration, it can obscure theoretically important variation in uncertainty levels.12
Empirical Analysis
In this section, we test our hypotheses by evaluating the effect of our new measure of uncertainty
on conﬂict behavior using two speciﬁcation forms. In the ﬁrst speciﬁcation, the unit of analysis
is the non-directed politically relevant dyad year spanning a temporal range from 1816 to 2000,
12Uncertainty and Dispersion scores are based on all states in the speciﬁed years, not solely the six strongest states
which are shown in Table 1 to highlight system attributes. The Uncertainty result holds in both its unweighted and
weighted forms.
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which yields a dataset of 77,710 observations. The second speciﬁcation instead uses system-year
(185 observations) or region-year (677 observations) as the unit of analysis.
In our ﬁrst speciﬁcation, following prior research designs, we restrict the study to politically
relevant dyads (Lemke and Reed, 2001).13 Non-directed dyads are appropriate as theories of un-
certainty’s role in conﬂict promotion speak to the likelihood of conﬂict, but are agnostic regarding
which side initiates it. Moreover, the degree of outcome uncertainty for each state in a dyad is
directly linked because an increase in one state’s uncertainty implies a matching increase for the
opposing state. As a result, using directed dyads would create an easy test by falsely inﬂating the
sample size. Conﬂict Onset is a dichotomous outcome variable that includes only the initial year of
a dispute between the two originating states as coded by the Militarized Interstate Disputes (MID)
data set (Jones, Bremer and Singer, 1996; Ghosn, Palmer and Bremer, 2004). The variable equals
one for conﬂict if the dispute entails the use of force—that is, for MIDs with a maximum hostility
level of four or ﬁve, corresponding to “use of force” or “war” respectively.14
Our explanatory variables of interest consist of the uncertainty scores discussed in the prior
section. The initial analysis employs System Uncertainty, both unweighted and weighted, which
represents a single score generated for each year based on all politically relevant dyads. Weights
on dyadic cells within the annual score matrix are based on (1) dyadic capabilities, (2) dyadic
capabilities and geographic proximity, or (3) dyadic capabilities and alliance portfolio similarity.
These procedures down-weight weak dyads, distant dyads, and dyads with similar foreign policy
positions. To evaluate our second hypothesis, we use Regional Uncertainty which incorporates
only major powers and neighbors of the constituent states for each dyadic observation.15 Thus
13Dyads must include contiguous states or at least one major power to be politically relevant.
14Findings are robust to alternative speciﬁcations of the outcome variable—such as including threats to use force
or displays of force.
15Regional Uncertainty involves an additional qualiﬁcation criteria. In non-contiguous major power-minor power
dyads, we drop minor powers that neighbor the major power from the uncertainty score calculation. For instance,
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Regional Uncertainty scores, unweighted and weighted, vary across dyads within a given year.
Weighting for Regional Uncertainty is analogous to the weighting for System Uncertainty. As a
ﬁnal means to examine uncertainty’s effect across various levels of analysis, we include a measure
Dyadic Uncertainty that ranges from 0 to 0.5 with higher values indicating greater uncertainty. The
variable reﬂects a dyad’s relative capabilities deﬁned by the ratio form contest success function
that we use to construct both System Uncertainty and Regional Uncertainty, but excludes any third
party actors. As a baseline for comparison, we also consider the effect of Dispersion, calculated as
1-CON (Ray and Singer, 1973).
In the second speciﬁcation form, which employs the system year or region year as the unit of
analysis, the number of annual Conﬂict Onsets in a year is the outcome variable. System Uncer-
tainty, deﬁned as above, is the explanatory variable of interest for system level tests. For the region
year speciﬁcation, we split all states into ﬁve geographic clusters—Europe, Asia and Oceania,
Middle East and North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa, and the Americas—and calculate an annual
uncertainty score for each region. This annual Regional Uncertainty score is the explanatory vari-
able in region year tests.
Control Variables
We control for variables linked to conﬂict in prior studies. The voluminous democratic peace
literature identiﬁes an empirical association between joint dyadic democracy and lower rates of
conﬂict (Oneal, Russett and Berbaum, 2003). Consequently, in our dyad year models, we include
a binary indicator Joint Democracy that takes a value of one when both states in a dyad have Polity
IV scores (Marshall and Jaggers, 2002) above six and zero otherwise. For the system and region
the 1990 US-Iraq dyad excludes the Dominican Republic which would otherwise qualify as contiguous with the US
because the two states are separated by less than 400 miles of water.
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year models, Joint Democracy reﬂects the percentage of democratic dyads.16 State proximity and
the presence of a shared border are strong predictors of conﬂict onset (Starr and Thomas, 2005;
Vasquez, 2009). Contiguity is an ordinal control variable ranging from one for states that share a
land or river border to six for states with no land border and separated by more than 400 miles of
water. Alliance, ranging from one to four, measures whether members of a dyad share a formal
defense pact, neutrality pact, or entente between them. We anticipate allied states are in conﬂict
less frequently. All results are robust to coding Contiguity and Alliance as dichotomous variables.
Rivalry is a binary indicator of competing objectives between two states that consider the use
of force a viable strategy. We opt for the Thompson (2001) rivalry dataset, which is qualitatively
coded—there are no strict MID thresholds for qualiﬁcation—with the primary criteria for inclusion
being “the actors in question must regard each other as (a) competitors, (b) the source of actual
or latent threats that pose some possibility of becoming militarized, and (c) enemies” (Thompson,
2001, 560). Following Carter and Signorino (2010), we account for temporal dependence in the
binary outcome time-series cross-section data with polynomial terms—Peace Years, Peace Years2,
and Peace Years3—measuring the duration of dyadic peace since the previous militarized dispute.
We use EUGene version 3.204 (Bennett and Stam, 2000) to construct the full data set. Summary
statistics are provided in the Online Appendix.
Results & Discussion
The results presentation begins with an analysis of uncertainty’s effect at the system level and then
moves to the regional level. Each, in turn, starts with the system or region year count models
before proceeding to the dyad year binary outcome speciﬁcations. With the system year as the unit
of analysis, we use negative binomial regression due to the conﬂict count outcome variable. Results
16Annual count models also control for the number of dyads and major powers in the system or region (Correlates
of War Project, Online, http://correlatesofwar.org 2008).
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in Model 1 of Table 2 corroborate our ﬁrst hypothesis, as higher uncertainty at the system level
induces a decline in the annual number of new conﬂicts when controlling for an array of variables,
including the growth in total states over time.17 Using Clarify (King, Tomz and Wittenberg, 2000)
to calculate the expected number of annual conﬂicts, we ﬁnd that system uncertainty has a sizable
substantive effect. The expected number of annual new conﬂicts is just under one when weighted
system uncertainty is at its 90th percentile value with all other covariates at their means. Shifting
uncertainty to its 10th percentile generates an additional 11 expected conﬂicts, plus or minus 4.5
at the 95% conﬁdence level. An effect of this magnitude offers strong support for our contention
that greater outcome uncertainty reduces conﬂict proclivity.
To further test system uncertainty’s effect, we employ an alternative speciﬁcation with the
dyad year as the unit of analysis. Given the dichotomous outcome variable of conﬂict onset, we
estimate the models using logistic regression with standard errors clustered at the dyad level. The
results in Table 2 offer additional support for our ﬁrst hypothesis that greater systemic uncertainty
reduces the probability of conﬂict. Model 2 provides a baseline speciﬁcation with the enumerated
control variables, unweighted system uncertainty, and dyadic uncertainty. As anticipated, Rivalry
and Contiguity are associated with more disputes, while Joint Democracy and Alliance18 have
pacifying effects.
Of particular note are the effects of our uncertainty variables. As theorized, system uncertainty
is negatively associated with conﬂict frequency, which suggests that the added complexity of a
highly uncertain international environment fosters cautious state behavior. In contrast, there is a
null ﬁnding for the effect of Dyadic Uncertainty, which indicates that outcome uncertainty that
disregards third parties has no association with conﬂict. On the other hand, robustness tests which
17This statistically signiﬁcant result is robust to employing alternative weightings that account for distance and
alliance portfolio similarity in the System Uncertainty measure.
18Lower Contiguity values denote greater proximity and lower Alliance values denote tighter, or any, alignment.
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exclude Rivalry as a control variable ﬁnd that Dyadic Uncertainty has a positive effect on conﬂict
likelihood. This mirrors prior results (for example, Bennett and Stam 2004) which ﬁnd that bal-
anced dyadic capabilities increase conﬂict likelihood. Our null result in the baseline speciﬁcation
suggests the effect of balanced capabilities on conﬂict proclivity is most likely not due to outcome
uncertainty, but instead is a result of rivalry being a common cause of dyadic balance of capabilities
and conﬂict.
Models 3 through 5 include System Uncertainty in its various weighted forms as denoted by
each model’s superscript.19 In all instances, greater uncertainty has a highly signiﬁcant effect re-
ducing dispute onset. System Uncertainty’s sizable effect reveals the importance of accounting
for system level attributes when evaluating the causes of conﬂict. The ﬁndings suggest that only
accounting for uncertainty at the dyadic level is a misspeciﬁcation, as states clearly account for
potential joiners when contemplating dispute initiation. Likelihood ratio tests conﬁrm that adding
the systemic uncertainty variable is a meaningful modeling improvement versus a reduced speci-
ﬁcation.20 In the Online Appendix we report a robustness check employing multilevel modeling
with dyad-year observations nested at both the year and dyad levels, which provides substantively
equivalent results. Taken together, these ﬁndings offer strong support for our contention that states
exhibit cautious behavior when facing greater uncertainty.
[Table 2 about here.]
How does our uncertainty measure compare to the widely used Dispersion variable? A model
(reported in the Online Appendix) that drops the uncertainty score while introducing Dispersion
to the speciﬁcation reveals a positive association between greater dispersion and more conﬂict.
19Weighting by (1) dyadic capabilities, (2) dyadic capabilities and geographic proximity, or (3) dyadic capabilities
and alliance portfolio similarity are respectively denoted by superscripts of (W ), (WD), and (WS).
20A likelihood ratio test comparing Model 3 to an otherwise identical model that excludes system uncertainty has
a p-value below 0.001.
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Given that past studies have used Dispersion, operationalized as 1-CON , as a proxy for uncer-
tainty, this ﬁnding is contrary to our hypothesis. However, as discussed and illustrated in Section
3, the proper interpretation of this result is ambiguous due to the tenuous theoretical linkages be-
tween uncertainty and capability concentration (Ray and Bentley, 2010). A Vuong test (Vuong,
1989) comparing non-nested regression speciﬁcations indicates that Model 3 using System Un-
certainty provides a superior approximation of the “true” model as compared to one employing
Dispersion.21 Model 6 offers further evidence of the uncertainty score’s relative merits versus
those of the concentration index. When both included in the model, uncertainty’s effect remains
large and essentially unchanged while system concentration is no longer associated with conﬂict
onset. Between its ﬁrm theoretical grounding and greater explanatory power, we ﬁnd our measure
to be a substantial improvement over the concentration index as a proxy for uncertainty.
Moving beyond statistical signiﬁcance, we calculate the substantive effects of system uncer-
tainty. To gauge the magnitude of uncertainty’s effect on the likelihood of conﬂict, we generate
predicted probabilities of conﬂict onset in two ways. First, what is uncertainty’s effect within rival-
rous dyads? These are particularly important cases, given their elevated baseline rates of conﬂict.
We ﬁnd that when decreasing system uncertainty from its 90th to its 10th percentile, with all other
variables held at their median values, the probability of conﬂict rises 5.9% points (plus or minus
2.5% points at the 95% conﬁdence level) from 9.7% to 15.6%.
Second, we turn to actual observations to identify uncertainty’s effect. Our objective is to select
observations balanced on all covariates except the level of system uncertainty. The US-UK 1868
and Argentina-UK 1982 dyads have similar values across all control variables. Both dyads are
territorially separated, involved in a rivalry, share no alliance, include one major power, and have
21The Vuong test comparing Model 3 to one substituting Dispersion for system uncertainty has a p-value below
0.01. Note, Model 3 is also superior to a speciﬁcation using polarity dummies rather than system uncertainty (p-value
< 0.001).
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similar magnitude power asymmetries. Only the prevailing level of system uncertainty differs,
with high uncertainty in 1868 and low uncertainty in 1982. The supporting appendix contains a
table summarizing the similarity of these two observations.
Consider how the different system uncertainty scores affect the probability of conﬂict. Figure 2
offers a graphical depiction of the following results. The 1868 UK-US dyad, in which the weighted
system uncertainty score fell in the 89th percentile of its range, has a 3.0% predicted probability of
conﬂict, plus or minus 1.1% at the 95% conﬁdence interval. In contrast, the 1982 UK-Argentina
dyad, with a system uncertainty score in the 12th percentile, has a 5.6% predicted probability
of conﬂict, plus or minus 1.5%. Increasing system uncertainty while holding all other values
essentially constant, increases the likelihood of conﬂict by nearly 90%, as shown in the right panel
of Figure 2, with the scope of the 95% conﬁdence interval denoted as well. In sum, greater system
uncertainty has a clear pacifying effect on interstate relations.
[Figure 2 about here.]
To provide further substantive intuition for how our measure of uncertainty operates, consider
the cases used in the previous analysis. We begin with a discussion of the peace that prevailed
between the US and UK in 1868. A lack of conﬂict cannot be attributed to a lack of disputed
matters. Dyadic tensions were elevated over both the Alabama Claims—American demands for
compensation for British acts violating neutrality during the Civil War22—and the perceived US
threat to Canada. High system uncertainty provides a candidate explanation for why conﬂict did
not erupt. Relative parity existed across a number of major powers at the time, as reﬂected by our
measure’s high score. Assessing a potential conﬂict’s outcome demanded that each side consider
the responses of a great many actors. Due to high system uncertainty, the multi-faceted diplomatic
maneuverings in Europe and the Near East by peer states demanded British attention (Taylor,
22See Cook (1975) for a treatment of the Alabama Claims and Anglo-American relations during this period.
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1954). Great uncertainty and its attendant complexity plausibly induced caution and helped foster
peace in the Anglo-American dyad.
In contrast, the dispute over the Falklands occurred in a comparatively certain environment.
Any military conﬂict between the UK and Argentina would hinge upon their respective capabilities
and the responses of the US and USSR. The low uncertainty level captured by our system measure
reﬂects this structure of global power asymmetries. This is not to say uncertainty over the conﬂict’s
outcome was the sole, or even primary, cause of war. Extant literature highlights the conﬂict
promoting roles of misperception (Lebow, 1985), bleak domestic prospects for the involved leaders
(Bueno de Mesquita, 2006), and a British aversion to losing territory in accordance with prospect
theory (Levy, 1992). Granting these factors, we suggest that the relative lack of parity in global
military capabilities simpliﬁed the strategic picture. Critically, the participants needed to assess the
American and Soviet responses. Gauging the former’s reaction was of paramount importance to
the junta, while the latter’s role was likely to be limited given the UK’s membership in NATO and
Argentina’s steadfast anticommunism (Lebow, 1985). While our measure does not reﬂect whether
potential combatants make accurate assessments, it does capture the relative complexity of this
task. As hypothesized, the more certain environment in 1982 was more conducive to conﬂict.
Does the observed relationship persist at different levels of analysis? Next, we consider whether
uncertainty has a similar pacifying effect when measured at the regional, rather than systemic,
level. An initial test employs the region year as the unit of analysis and a negative binomial model
with the count of annual new conﬂicts in that region as the outcome variable. Recall that we split
all states into ﬁve geographic clusters and calculate an annual uncertainty score in each region
for this speciﬁcation.23 As Model 7 of Table 3 indicates, greater uncertainty is associated with a
decline in regional conﬂict onset, which accords with the second hypothesis. Regional uncertainty
has a large substantive effect, as reducing its value from the 90th percentile to the 10th nearly
23Note that the count of new regional conﬂict onsets excludes inter-regional uses of force.
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quadruples the expected number of regional conﬂicts per year. Such a shift produces an extra 1.6
(± 0.4) expected conﬂicts against a baseline of 0.6 when high regional uncertainty prevails. These
results offer initial support for the contention that uncertainty’s effect operates across levels of
analysis.
We further explore the effects of regional uncertainty by turning to a dyad year speciﬁcation
with a binary conﬂict onset outcome variable. Unlike System Uncertainty, the Regional Uncer-
tainty dyad year measure varies within a given year, as the constitutive matrix for the score con-
tains different states for each dyad due to variation in bordering states. This formulation may offer
a better reﬂection of the factors likely to inﬂuence policy-makers’ decisions. For instance, when
contemplating whether to use force in Somalia, Kenyan leaders may consider the responses from
Ethiopia and the US but not from Ecuador. Models 8 through 10 of Table 3 provide logistic re-
gression results incorporating regional uncertainty while controlling for the same variables as in
prior logit speciﬁcations. We employ scores weighted by capabilities in all models while Models
9 and 10 additionally weight based on alliance portfolio similarity and distance respectively. As
Table 3 shows, while the region year speciﬁcation supports the second hypothesis, regional uncer-
tainty in the dyad year models provides mixed results depending on the weighting. Unlike system
uncertainty, a higher regional score does not uniformly reduce the probability of conﬂict. The
hypothesized effect is only present when the measure weights dyads by capabilities and distance.
[Table 3 about here.]
To explore the mixed ﬁnding, we consider explanations for why state behavior may not exhibit
the expected tendencies in some speciﬁcations. One immediate possibility is that the model is
misspeciﬁed by only including a subset of third party states. That is, states may consider the whole
system as their relevant set. A Vuong test corroborates this postulation, as Model 3 employing the
system uncertainty measure provides a superior speciﬁcation—p-value below 0.001—compared to
Model 8 using regional uncertainty.
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An alternative hypothesis to explain the mixed support is that, in some settings, potential con-
ﬂict initiators are prone to miscalculating the level of uncertainty. Otherwise cautious actors may
end up initiating conﬂict during periods of high uncertainty in situations where they fail to accu-
rately assess the uncertainty level. This form of miscalculation ought to occur in circumstances
where states are most prone to making mistakes regarding characteristics of their target state and
the relevant set of third party actors.
When is information transparency likely to be greatest so as to minimize the chances of states
miscalculating the level of uncertainty? The expected prudent behavior ought to be evident in
these high-information cases if our proposition is accurate. We identify two scenarios that ﬁt
these conditions. First, geographic proximity may affect information levels. Closer dyads are less
miscalculation prone than those separated by great distances.24 In accordance with this conjecture,
regional uncertainty has a statistically signiﬁcant pacifying effect in Model 10 which up-weights
proximate dyads.
Second, the time period might inﬂuence the probability of miscalculation as recent years are
marked by an increased velocity of information and global interactions (Keohane and Nye, 2000).
Model 11 tests this proposition, examining regional uncertainty’s effect for all observations after
the Cold War, deﬁned as post-1991. The results are consistent with our second hypothesis; higher
regional uncertainty reduces the likelihood of conﬂict. Incidentally, note that the average number
of states in the relevant set is greater after the Cold War.25 This ﬁts the initial conjecture that the
system is the proper relevant set speciﬁcation as we observe greater state caution when the number
of third parties incorporated into the regional variable increases. In sum, uncertainty’s pacifying
effect may be diluted by including a limited set of actors as opposed to the entire system, or in
24Note, this is not to say proximity reduces the amount of conﬂict; plainly it does not as contiguity is a strong pre-
dictor of conﬂict onset (Bennett and Stam, 2004; Vasquez, 2009). We merely suggest that disputes between bordering
states are explained by mechanisms outside the scope of our analysis.
25Average size of the relevant set increases from 13.5 states before 1992 to 18.5 after the Cold War.
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settings prone to miscalculating the level of uncertainty. Once accounting for these possibilities,
we ﬁnd robust support for our second hypothesis.
Figure 3 illustrates regional uncertainty’s substantive effect on conﬂict onset. For this analysis,
we select representative observations from each model with similar baseline predicted probabilities
of conﬂict.26 We calculate the relative change in conﬂict probability over this baseline rate when
shifting Regional Uncertainty from its 90th percentile to its 10th percentile values. As noted, we
cannot preclude the null hypothesis in the base speciﬁcation with regional uncertainty weighted
only by dyadic capabilities. However, in information-rich settings, decreasing uncertainty has the
anticipated incendiary effect.
[Figure 3 about here.]
Our results illustrate the importance of testing theories at different levels of analysis. Sys-
temic uncertainty’s strong effect aligns with our theory positing that states are on average wary
of estimation complexity and will pause when confronting greater outcome uncertainty. Regional
uncertainty offers a more tenuous result. Though the peace-inducing effect of higher regional
uncertainty is evident in region-year speciﬁcations as well as in information-rich dyadic settings,
we do not observe the anticipated cautious behavior across all models. Finally, uncertainty at the
dyadic level, which ignores the role of third parties, has no relationship with conﬂict. The positive
correlation between outcome uncertainty’s effect size and the level of analysis’ geographic breadth
offers an avenue for further inquiry linking uncertainty over conﬂict outcomes to conﬂict initia-
tion. Furthermore, the heterogenous ﬁndings at the system, regional, and dyadic levels of analysis
highlight the beneﬁts of our measure’s ﬂexible construction, which allows researchers to deﬁne the
relevant set of states for each observation in a theoretically informed manner.
26This analysis uses the following dyads: China-Taiwan 1976 for the all dyads model weighted by capabilities,
Poland-Germany 1933 for the all dyads model weighted by capabilities and distance, and Russia-Latvia 1996 for
post-Cold War dyads. All have similar baseline predicted probabilities of conﬂict of 6.0%, ± 0.5%.
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Conclusion
We have introduced a new theory specifying the determinants of outcome uncertainty and linking
the degree of uncertainty to conﬂict behavior. When uncertainty over outcomes is elevated, which,
for instance, occurs in multipolar settings with broad power parity between states, the probability
of war onset is diminished. To test this contention, we developed a new measure of outcome un-
certainty and highlighted its theoretical foundations, which make it a strong proxy for this central
concept of interest. Once constructed, the variable allowed us to explore whether higher outcome
uncertainty yields greater caution and fosters peace. Extensive empirical analysis conﬁrms that
it does. Elevated system uncertainty is strongly linked to reduced conﬂict probabilities. Our re-
gional measure also corroborates, albeit tentatively, this relationship. We hope that this is only
the beginning of investigation into uncertainty’s effects as the new measure allows researchers to
shift outcome uncertainty from the error term to a concrete right hand side variable. Furthermore,
our theory’s emphasis on third party actors highlights the fruitfulness of incorporating regional
and systemic attributes to supplement the typical dyadic measures used to study conﬂict. Incorpo-
rating third parties into a theory of outcome uncertainty reveals the limitations, and questionable
conclusions, of exclusively bilateral approaches.
We conclude with a substantive implication of our ﬁndings and a thought concerning the
broader research agenda investigating uncertainty and its role in international conﬂict. The re-
sults of this article may have a striking implication for understanding or predicting future conﬂict.
As evident in Figure 1, system uncertainty weighted by capabilities reached its lowest level in
the ﬁnal year of the available data. According to our results, this does not bode well for peace’s
prospects. In agreement with recent scholarship (for example, Monteiro 2011), the current con-
ﬁguration of power appears prone to unrest. Shifts toward parity, particularly amongst the most
powerful nations, may actually be a harbinger of peace as states adopt more cautious postures due
to increasing uncertainty over conﬂict outcomes.
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As for the wider role of uncertainty in conﬂict, our ﬁndings do not suggest all forms of un-
certainty are pacifying, which would contradict the literature on asymmetric information over an
opponent’s capabilities or resolve (Fearon, 1995; Slantchev and Tarar, 2011). These forms of un-
certainty, unmeasured in this study, may bolster or attenuate the observed effects. Instead, our
focus is restricted to the uncertainty over outcomes arising from stochasticity inherent to conﬂict.
Identifying proxies to reﬂect uncertainty over intentions or uncertainty over resolve and capabil-
ities would be an ambitious and worthwhile next step. Novel theoretical work (for example, Fey
and Ramsay 2011; Mitzen and Schweller 2011; Bas and Coe 2012) points to the importance and
relevance of such efforts, as well as their difﬁculty. New measures and methods can generate the-
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Table 1: Properties of the Uncertainty Measure
Panel A: Varieties of Polarity—Non-Directed War Outcome Probabilities
Multipolar
UK Russia France US A-H
UK X
Russia 0.36 X
France 0.32 0.46 X
US 0.21 0.32 0.36 X
A-H 0.18 0.28 0.31 0.45 X
1855: Uncertainty=0.66
Bipolar
US USSR China UK India
US X
USSR 0.40 X
China 0.26 0.34 X
UK 0.16 0.22 0.36 X
India 0.14 0.20 0.33 0.47 X
1955: Uncertainty=0.58
Multipolar
US Germany Russia UK China
US X
Germany 0.38 X
Russia 0.36 0.47 X
UK 0.34 0.46 0.48 X
China 0.34 0.45 0.48 0.49 X
1912: Uncertainty=0.85
Bipolar
US USSR China India Japan
US X
USSR 0.47 X
China 0.43 0.46 X
India 0.30 0.32 0.36 X
Japan 0.29 0.31 0.34 0.49 X
1990: Uncertainty=0.75
Each entry indicates a dyad’s power balance, calculated as min{CA,CB}
CA+CB
. By deﬁnition, the tables are
symmetric. Blue text indicates cases distant from parity.
Panel B: CON vs. Uncertainty in Practice
Top 6 State’s CINC Scores Attributes Measures
1 2 3 4 5 6 Multipolar Balanced Dispersion Uncertainty
1890 0.18 0.17 0.16 0.13 0.10 0.10 Yes Yes Low High
1992 0.15 0.12 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.03 No No High Low
Based on system attributes, 1890 should have greater outcome uncertainty than 1992. The Uncer-
tainty measure, unweighted or weighted by capabilities, captures this while Dispersion, measured
as 1-CON, does not. Scores are calculated using all states in the speciﬁed years.
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Table 2: System Uncertainty, Concentration, and Conﬂict
System Year Dyad Year
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
UncW Unc UncW UncWS UncWD UncW + Disp
System Uncertainty -10.563∗∗∗ -8.527∗∗∗ -2.476∗∗∗ -1.686∗∗∗ -2.346∗∗∗ -2.485∗∗∗
(1.570) (1.197) (0.511) (0.486) (0.517) (0.531)
Dispersion — — — — — -0.036
(0.891)
Dyadic Uncertainty — 0.108 0.090 0.072 0.087 0.090
(0.430) (0.431) (0.434) (0.432) (0.432)
Contiguity — -0.200∗∗∗ -0.201∗∗∗ -0.204∗∗∗ -0.202∗∗∗ -0.201∗∗∗
(0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030)
Joint Democracy 0.481 -0.675∗∗∗ -0.664∗∗∗ -0.659∗∗∗ -0.650∗∗∗ -0.664∗∗∗
(1.421) (0.186) (0.185) (0.185) (0.185) (0.184)
Rivalry — 1.340∗∗∗ 1.323∗∗∗ 1.301∗∗∗ 1.316∗∗∗ 1.323∗∗∗
(0.140) (0.140) (0.141) (0.140) (0.139)
Alliance — 0.088∗ 0.080 0.072 0.080 0.080
(0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044)
Number Major Powers 0.395∗∗∗ — — — — —
(0.096)
Number Dyads 0.000 — — — — —
(0.000)
Constant 2.594∗∗∗ -0.678∗ -2.023∗∗∗ -2.158∗∗∗ -2.027∗∗∗ -1.995∗∗
(0.382) (0.322) (0.231) (0.229) (0.233) (0.699)
lnalpha -1.199∗∗∗
(0.250)
N 185 77,710 77,710 77,710 77,710 77,710
∗p < 0.05,∗∗ p < 0.01,∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Notes: Superscripts on models indicate weighted by capabilities (W ), capabilities and S-scores (WS), or capabilities and
distance (WD). Model 1 reports negative binomial regression results with the annual conﬂict count as the outcome. Models
2-6 report logistic regression results with standard errors clustered on the dyad. Temporal controls are not shown.
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Table 3: Regional Uncertainty and Conﬂict
Region Year Dyad Year
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
UncW UncW UncWS UncWD Post-Cold War
Regional Uncertainty -3.480∗∗∗ -0.813 0.613 -1.062∗ -3.354∗
(0.495) (0.599) (0.541) (0.518) (1.340)
Dyadic Uncertainty — 0.101 -0.051 0.111 1.410
(0.440) (0.446) (0.439) (0.818)
Contiguity — -0.229∗∗∗ -0.191∗∗∗ -0.234∗∗∗ -0.499∗∗∗
(0.031) (0.032) (0.031) (0.087)
Joint Democracy -0.896∗∗ -0.620∗∗∗ -0.583∗∗ -0.628∗∗∗ -0.822∗∗
(0.331) (0.184) (0.185) (0.183) (0.306)
Rivalry — 1.238∗∗∗ 1.226∗∗∗ 1.251∗∗∗ 1.061∗∗∗
(0.149) (0.147) (0.149) (0.249)
Alliance — 0.054 0.047 0.060 -0.060
(0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.080)
Number Great Powers -0.165∗ — — — —
(0.080)
Number Dyads 0.009∗∗∗ — — — —
(0.003)
Constant 1.711∗∗∗ -2.199∗∗∗ -2.772∗∗∗ -2.113∗∗∗ -0.332
(0.281) (0.304) (0.318) (0.271) (0.562)
lnalpha -0.127
(0.204)
N 677 77,710 77,553 77,710 12,336
∗p < 0.05,∗∗ p < 0.01,∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Notes: Superscripts on models indicate weighted by capabilities (W ), capabilities and S-scores (WS), or capabil-
ities and distance (WD). Model 7 reports negative binomial regression results with the annual regional conﬂict
count as the outcome. Models 8-11 report logistic regression results with standard errors clustered on the dyad.
Temporal controls are not shown.
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Figure 2: Effect of Decreasing System Uncertainty on Conﬂict Probability with 95% Conﬁdence
Bounds
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●Effect of Regional Uncertainty









Figure 3: Effect of Decreasing Regional Uncertainty from 90th to 10th Percentile with 95% Con-
ﬁdence Bounds.
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